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The Fourth Branch of Government 






This paper aims to explore how direct democracy (i.e. the initiative and referendum) affect the balance of 
power in state governments. Traditionally, like the federal government, state governments consist of three 
branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. Due to a complex system of checks and balances, one branch 
cannot become too powerful, adhering to an anti-monarchy sentiment of the founders of the United States. 
In this set-up, the legislative branch is responsible for creating policy, the executive branch is responsible for 
implementing it, and the judicial branch is responsible for interpreting it. My thesis is that direct democracy, 
by allowing the populous to directly implement policy without bearing the responsibility for their actions as 
politicians do, undermines the legislative branch and therefore representative democracy itself, leading to 
irresponsible legislation that is not subject to the scrutiny of the United States political process. 
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In 1911, during his Inaugural speech, newly 
elected governor of California Hiram Johnson declared, 
“I most strongly urge, that the first step in our design to 
preserve and perpetuate popular government shall be 
the adoption of the Initiative, Referendum, and 
Recall.”1 Imagine what his surprise would be to see The 
Economist declare in a special report on the state 100 
years later that “California is an experiment in extreme 
democracy gone wrong.”2 Over the span of a century, 
California has gone from being a forerunner in the 
direct democracy movement to becoming a stellar 
example of the positive effects of the initiative process, 
to being referred to as a “„dysfunctional‟, 
„ungovernable‟ and even „failed‟ state.‟”3 The situation 
in California is only one prominent example of a 
problem that has seeped into state government. This 
essay aims to examine the processes of direct 
democracy (i.e. initiative and referendum), which have 
become much stronger political forces in the latter half 
of the 21st century and have altered the balance of 
power in western state governments, using California as 
a case study of these problems. 
 First, it would be beneficial to examine how 
direct democracy first came to be used in state 
governments. After all, the processes that affect state 
politics today were not present until the end of the 19th 
century. That being said, some sort of popular vote to 
decide state legislative functions has been present since 
shortly after the nation‟s inception. In 1778, 
Massachusetts held a statewide legislative referendum 
that allowed the state‟s constituents to accept or reject 
its proposed constitution.4 Many states have used this 
process to establish state constitutions, and in the 
modern United States every state except Delaware 
requires a legislative referendum for a constitutional 
amendment to be passed.5 However, shifts in power did 
not happen until much later because of the differences 
between legislative referendum and other forms of 
direct democracy. 
There are two different processes used to hold 
a piece of legislation up to a popular vote among a 
state‟s constituents: the initiative and the referendum. A 
referendum is held to allow the people to accept or 
reject laws that have passed through the legislature. 
This is the less powerful form of direct democracy, as 
far as citizens are concerned. This essay will focus on 
the initiative. The initiative is more powerful because it 
allows a state‟s constituents to both draft and vote on 
legislation. There are also two different types of 
initiative processes that a state can adopt: the indirect 
initiative and the direct initiative. In both, a piece of 
legislation is written by someone or some organization, 
then a certain number of signatures are gathered from 
other citizens in that state to have the proposed 
legislation considered. In an indirect initiative, the 
prospective bill must be approved by the legislature or 
sufficiently overridden by the additional collection of 
signatures if the legislature does not approve it. 
However, in a direct initiative, the legislature plays no 
role, and the bill is put up to a vote once the proper 
number of signatures is acquired and the document is 
submitted.6 
While legislative referendums were held 
before the 19th century, the first state that adopted an 
initiative process was South Dakota, in 1898. Even 
then, it took another six years until the first statewide 
initiative was voted on, in Oregon. As it turns out, the 
turn of the century was a breeding ground for direct 
democracy in the United States. During the 10-year 
span between 1898 and 1918, 24 states adopted either 
an initiative or popular referendum process. This reform 
was driven by the populist movement in the country at 
that time. As US citizens became increasingly angry at 
the grip big business had on the government and at the 
lack of rights they themselves had, the populist 
movement lobbied for many different types of reform, 
including women‟s suffrage, the direct election of 
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senators, and, of course, the implementation of the 
initiative and referendum processes on the state level. 
However, most of the reforms made concerning direct 
democracy were in the West, which some claim 
resulted from the spirit of expansion that blossomed 
there.7 
Before we examine the effect these changes 
had on state governments, we must look at the 
structures of these institutions and how direct 
democracy alters their balance of power. In general, 
state governments are modeled after the federal 
government. Each state government consists of three 
branches: the executive, legislative, and judicial. Each 
is responsible for implementing, creating, and 
interpreting laws, respectively. Like the national 
government, the state executive branch has an elected 
governor, but most other positions in the state executive 
branch are elected, as opposed to the presidentially 
appointed cabinet. The state legislative branch has two 
houses, like Congress and the House of 
Representatives, and the composition of the state 
judicial branch mirrors that of the federal judiciary as 
well.8 Now, the federal government has a limited form 
of direct democracy in Article V of the Constitution; 
however, since the legislative branch has to vote to put 
this into effect, it has never been a useful tool of direct 
democracy.9 The state government‟s initiative is much 
more powerful. 
When the founding fathers created the nation‟s 
government, they created a set of checks and balances 
between the three branches of government to limit the 
power of each individual branch. Accordingly, since 
state governments are structured in a similar fashion, 
they work in roughly the same way. That being said, the 
existent power structure of state governments has been 
radically changed, due to a fourth branch of 
government: direct democracy. The proper comparison 
for this additional branch would be the legislative 
branch, because it implements policy. The difference 
lies primarily in the sense of responsibility each branch 
has for its action. When the legislative branch of a state 
passes a bill, its elected representatives are held 
responsible for the success or failure of the policy and 
more importantly in our analysis, how to finance it. 
When a law is passed via initiative, the document does 
not have to provide a way to pay for it, or even specify 
how it‟s going to be paid. Karen Bass, a former 
assembly leader in California once said, “We have 
control of only 10 percent of our budget. Whatever the 
precise percentage is, voters long ago seized most 
power of appropriation from their legislature.”10 On top 
of this, the national legislature, and thus state 
legislatures as well, was designed to be a slow-moving 
political body; accordingly, it is very hard to pass a law 
without a clear majority approval, which protects the 
rights of minorities. When an initiative is put up to a 
vote, on the other hand, it only requires a majority to 
pass. Thus direct democracy becomes not only a tool 
for irresponsible change, but also for suppressing the 
rights and interests of minority citizens. 
Now, let us take a step back and analyze that 
new structure of the system. If we construct a model of 
a state government with an active population that 
regularly submits initiatives, we arrive at a somewhat 
similar system, but with two branches doing the job of 
the legislative branch, formulating policy. Instead of 
one elected legislative body writing and voting on 
policy, the people perform the function of creating and 
implementing policy, while the legislative branch is left 
struggling to find a way to pay for it. 
  
Vol. 8, No. 1 (2011)    |    ISSN 2160-5807(online)    |    DOI 10.5195/ppr.2011.10    |    http://ppr.pitt.edu  
 
23 | P a g e  
 
 
To illustrate this power shift, consider the state 
of California, which is well known for its use of the 
referendum. California adopted both the initiative and 
referendum processes in 1911, during the wave of 
reform caused by the populist movement. However, the 
movement for direct democracy in this state was 
focused on a single enemy, the Southern Pacific 
Railroad. Known as “„The Octopus‟ because its 
tentacles corrupted every part of the state,” this railroad 
company‟s extensive control of state politics drove 
California progressives to change the structure of their 
state government.11 It was eventually this attitude that 
made California into the state it is today. Unlike how it 
is used in California, direct democracy is designed to 
provide an outlet for the people to work with their 
government to find policy solutions, not against it. 
Ironically, the confrontational attitude in the state led to 
disaster in later years. 
Between 1912 and 2000, California held 275 
initiatives up to a vote, with a 35 percent passage rate.12 
Potential legislation subjects ranged from prohibition to 
banking reform, but nothing notable passed until 1978. 
During this year, an initiative supported by local leader 
Howard Jarvis, Proposition 13, was passed. The people 
wanted to lower property taxes, and so they did. 
However, in addition to doing this, they added an 
additional clause stating that for the legislature to raise 
taxes in the state, it needed a two-thirds supermajority. 
Despite this decrease in current and future revenue, the 
bill had no appropriations on how to pay for these tax 
decreases. Consequently, the local governments in 
California, including schools, counties, and cities, 
found themselves in debt from a loss of a major source 
of revenue. Fortunately, the state government had a 
surplus that year, so they gave money to these local 
bodies to help them deal with the shock. As one might 
expect, this “one-off transfer turned into a permanent 
financing mechanism.”13 Essentially, the local 
governmental bodies became dependent on state 
government funding. Obviously, the effects of the 
initiative process can reach farther than the state, 
endangering the stability of cities, counties, and 
schools, while effectively centralizing the state‟s 
finances.14  
Proposition 13 was only the start of 
California‟s troubles. As the modern era dawned, new 
inventions changed the initiative process in ways that 
progressives in 1911 could not have imagined. The 
main malformation was the way signatures were 
acquired. In the ideal initiative process, a citizen or 
group of citizens would come up with an idea for a 
change. They would then gather enough signatures 
from other citizens who support the bill as well, so that 
the bill could be put on the ballot for voting. 
Unfortunately, the process of getting signatures turned 
into an industry. Professional signature gatherers were 
employed by those who had the money, mostly big 
businesses, to obtain signatures in support of a bill that 
an organization wanted to pass into law. In effect, a 
new more direct form of lobbying was invented. 
Interestingly enough, the Southern Pacific Railroad 
sponsored a successful initiative in 1990, using the very 
mechanism that was created to stop its influence. As 
Karen Bass puts it, “any billionaire can change the state 
constitution.”15 This feature of the modern initiative 
system is still working in full force; the online retailer 
Amazon is sponsoring a referendum to overturn the 
state‟s Internet sales tax law that it hopes will be on the 
ballot by June 2012.16 
Now, let us look at some ways to fix this 
system. As we have seen, there are three clear faults: a 
lack of responsibility; the suppression of the voice of 
the minority; and the enhanced form of lobbying the 
system creates. First, to promote responsibility, the best 
solution would be to implement a law through the 
legislature that would require those proposing an 
Source: www.legislature.ca.gov 
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initiative to provide an explanation about how the state 
would finance implementation of the bill. Even if the 
proposed financing plan is ineffective in helping to pay 
for an initiative, it will at least force the proponents of 
the bill to consider costs. Second, to give minorities 
more of a voice, the legislative branch must be brought 
back into the process, because it was designed to 
uphold minority rights. One way to do this would be to 
encourage the use of the indirect initiative. That way, 
the legislature would have the ability to work with 
citizens on proposing initiatives. At the same time, the 
people would still be able to bypass the legislature, but 
it would require a two-thirds majority if the constituents 
vote. Addressing the third fault, lobbying, is the most 
challenging. The idea is to not limit who can submit an 
initiative, as that would infringe on citizens‟ rights, but 
to discourage the use of the initiative as a lobbying tool. 
Perhaps a statewide campaign that informs citizens of 
the power of their signature or legislation limiting the 
ways in which signatures can be obtained could be 
effective. However, as we have seen on the national 
stage, lobbying is a powerful force. The best strategy 
may be containment, as opposed to trying to eliminate it 
entirely. 
As state senator Loni Hancock put it, “The 
initiative and referendum process have been 
hijacked.”17 In the face of soaring deficits and a gloomy 
national recession, all we can do is wait to see what 
state governments will do to counter this problem. 
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